

Factors that underpin the trend of regulatory progress in insurance markets




Local pressure to modernize and improve regulatory frameworks in the face of advances in the financial system



Progress of regional (Solvency II, SST, SMI) and global (ICS-IAIS) regulatory systems

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Solvency II, SST, SMI







### Risk-based regulation proximity index

The Risk-based regulation proximity index (I-RBR) seeks to identify the degree of progress of different regulatory frameworks in terms of their transit:

- from a basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type),
- **to** a regulation focused on a more precise risk management, the strengthening of corporate governance, and a higher transparency and information disclosure towards the market (Solvency II-type).



Elements that are typically closer to regulation less sensitive to the particular risk profile of each insurer

Transition elements that introduce a higher complexity and closeness towards risk-based capital models

Risk-based regulation elements aimed measuring individual risk profiles

### GROUP

Elements that are typically closer to regulation less sensitive to the particular risk profile of each insurer

Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)

Transition elements that introduce a higher complexity and closeness towards risk-based capital models

Risk-based regulation elements aimed measuring individual risk profiles GROUP

A

GROUP

В

Elements that are typically closer to regulation less sensitive to the particular risk profile of each insurer

Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)

Transition elements that introduce a higher complexity and closeness towards risk-based capital models

Transition regulation

Risk-based regulation elements aimed measuring individual risk profiles



Elements that are typically closer to regulation less sensitive to the particular risk profile of each insurer

Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)

Transition elements that introduce a higher complexity and closeness towards risk-based capital models

Transition regulation

Risk-based regulation elements aimed measuring individual risk profiles

Pure-risk based regulation (Solvency II-type)

#### **GROUP (5 ELEMENTS)**

A

Elements that are typically closer to regulation less sensitive to the particular risk profile of each insurer

Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)

- Limits on investments:
  list of admisible assets
- Limits on investments: percentages of diversification
- Life and Non-Life underwriting risks: not disaggregated
- Prudential interest rate in mathematical provisions
- Authorization / prior filing of insurance policies and/ or technical bases

GROUP (10 ELEMENTS)

В

Transition elements that introduce a higher complexity and closeness towards risk-based capital models

Transition regulation

- Market valuation of assets
- ✓ Valuation of technical provisions: best estimate and risk margin
- Reinsurance regulation counterparty risk
- Underwriting risk by homogenous groups
- Financial risks

- Asset-liability mismatch risk
- Operational risk
- Market transparency risk profile
- Governance requirements: key functions/risks
- Risk analysis of specific operations at group level (without capital requirements)


GROUP (8 ELEMENTS)

Risk-based regulation elements aimed measuring individual risk profiles


Pure-risk based regulation (Solvency II-type)

- Explicit risk measures and dependencies between risks
- Internal risk models
- Stress tests Dynamic solvency ORSA
- Asset market valuation (without exceptions)


- Discount of technical provisions with risk-free rates (without adjustments)
- ✓ Governance requirements: full integration of risk functions
- Market transparency complete breakdown of risk components
- Risk-based regulatory capital at group level (with group capital requirement)




- Pure-risk based regulation (Solvency II-type)
- Transition regulation
- Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)




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
$$I-RBR = a(p_a) + b(p_b) + c(p_c)$$

where:  $p_a = 0.3$ 

 $p_{\rm b} = 0.6$ 


 $p_{c} = 1.0$ 

- Pure-risk based regulation (Solvency II-type)
- Transition regulation
- Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)



# EUROPEAN UNION (Solvency II)

- Pure-risk based regulation (Solvency II-type)
- Transition regulation
- Basic-risk based regulation (Solvency I-type)





Regulatory regimes with Solvency II equivalence


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


# Risk-based regulations (Solvency II-type)









Risk management




Market review





Governance requirements




Products and competition







1)



modeling tasks.

- Efficient financial markets whose development makes it possible to undertake efficient asset-liability management (ALM).
- Absence of legal limitations for undertaking investments as part of the ALM process.
- Absence of legal barriers to reinsurance operations, in such a way that it is possible to adequately disperse and mitigate technical risks.
- Development of a business culture and maturity in the organizational culture of insurers.
- Directors and board members with knowledge and experience on risk management.
- Absence of limitations for adjusting product pricing as part of efficient risk management.
- Assessment mechanisms that facilitate the functioning of the market discipline mechanism.

Quantitative requirements



Governance requirements




Products and competition



Market review





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Products and competition










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Governance




**Products and** competition



Market





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Governance requirements



Products and competition



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**Products and** 

competition

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(ICP Supervisor and responsibilities of the Supervisor (ICP powers Objectives,

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
Factors for a stability-typology of regulatory models in insurance





Degree of implementation of RBR



Development of institutional and market preconditions







Degree of implementation of RBR High

#### Stable and mature models

(Mature regulations in which it is expected that prudential and market advantages resulting from the RBR can be obtained)

Low

Development of institutional and market preconditions

High

## Stable models prior to reform

(Regulations prior to start a reform and that must make progress in the development of institutional and market preconditions)

NO W

Degree of implementation of RBR High

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### Stable models with potential for adjuntan to RBR

(Regulations with potential for progressing toward RBR but that are subject to institutional restrictions or conditions for doing so)

#### **Unstable models**

(Regulations that must make progress in the development of preconditions and subject to potential unintended consequences)

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# MAPFRE